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Knowing and Being, Essays ePub download

by Marjorie Grene,Michael Polanyi

  • Author: Marjorie Grene,Michael Polanyi
  • ISBN: 0226672840
  • ISBN13: 978-0226672847
  • ePub: 1137 kb | FB2: 1540 kb
  • Language: English
  • Category: Philosophy
  • Publisher: The Univeersity of Chicago Press (June 15, 1969)
  • Pages: 264
  • Rating: 4.1/5
  • Votes: 682
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Knowing and Being, Essays ePub download

Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a Hungarian-British chemist and philosopher; he wrote other books . These essays shed much light on other areas of Polanyi’s philosophy, which are not covered in his books such as Personal Knowledge.

Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a Hungarian-British chemist and philosopher; he wrote other books such as Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy,The Tacit Dimension,The Logic of Liberty,Science, Faith, and Society, etc. He points out, The inconsistency of a science professing that it can explain all human action without making value judgments, while the scientist’s private actions are said to be often motivated by moral motives, can be more simply demonstrated the other way round.

Similar books and articles. Knowing and Being Essays. Michael Polanyi & Marjorie Glicksman Grene - 1969 - University of Chicago Press. Knowing and Being: Essays. Michael Polanyi - 1969 - London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. From Tacit Knowing to a Theory of Faith

Similar books and articles. Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi. Michael Polanyi - 1969 - University of Chicago Press. Rethinking Polanyi’s Concept of Tacit Knowledge: From Personal Knowing to Imagined Institutions. From Tacit Knowing to a Theory of Faith. Richard L. Gelwick - 2014 - Tradition and Discovery 41 (1):10-20. The Projects of Michael Polanyi and Charles Taylor. John V. Apczynski - 2014 - Tradition and Discovery 41 (1):21-32.

This was the actual beginning of the Hungarian Revolution, which broke out. Стр. 25 I am not asking whether we ought to have aided the Hungarian Revolution by money or the force of arms. I am asking about our intellectual and moral responses. What did we think, what do we think today, of this change of mind among many. 33 According to this theory the scientific method can establish, for example, that the rebellious Hungarian intellectuals attributed moral value to the freedom of truth and felt that the doctrine of Party-truth caused a moral corruption of public life; but.

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Knowing and Being book. This collection of essays, assembled by Marjorie Grene, exemplifies the development of Polanyi's theory of knowledge which was first presented in Science, Faith, and Society and later systematized in Personal Knowledge. Polanyi believes that the dilemma of the modern mind arises from the peculiar relation between the positivist claim for total objectivity in scientific knowledge and the unprecedented moral dynamism characterizing the social and political aspirations of the last century.

Items related to Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi. Polanyi, Michael Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi. ISBN 13: 9780226672854.

Автор: Polanyi, Michael Grene, Marjorie Название: Knowing and being .

Место встречи изменить нельзя (1979) - Продолжительность: 5:57:21 СМОТРИМ. Золотая коллекция русского кино Recommended for you. 5:57:21. What is TACIT KNOWLEDGE?

Building on this background, I discuss the approach and scope of the book. In M. Grene (E., Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi.

Secondly, I outline peculiarities of Polanyi’s work to be considered when examining Knowing and Being. Building on this background, I discuss the approach and scope of the book. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Polanyi’s Appreciation of Marjorie Grene Grene’s role in Polanyi’s life and .

Polanyi’s Appreciation of Marjorie Grene Grene’s role in Polanyi’s life and thought is given clear voice in the Acknowledgements section of 33. Personal Knowledge: This work owes much to Marjorie Grene. That is the thesis Michael Polanyi struggled to give voice to both inPersonal Knowledge and in The Tacit Dimension and some of his later essays. The second unit of Grene’s book shifts from knowing to being and the first of three chapters inthis section compares being-in-the-world in Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, all figures she has writtenabout previously.

Because of the difficulty posed by the contrast between the search for truth and truth itself, Michael Polanyi believes that we must alter the foundation of epistemology to include as essential to the very nature of mind, the kind of groping that constitutes the recognition of a problem.This collection of essays, assembled by Marjorie Grene, exemplifies the development of Polanyi's theory of knowledge which was first presented in Science, Faith, and Society and later systematized in Personal Knowledge.
Ballagar
excellent!
Linn
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a Hungarian-British chemist and philosopher; he wrote other books such as Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy,The Tacit Dimension,The Logic of Liberty,Science, Faith, and Society, etc.

He points out, “The inconsistency of a science professing that it can explain all human action without making value judgments, while the scientist’s private actions are said to be often motivated by moral motives, can be more simply demonstrated the other way round. If the social scientist can explain all human actions by value-free observations, then none of his own actions can claim to be motivated by moral values. Either he exempts himself from his own theory of human motivation, or he must conclude that all reference to moral values---or any values---are meaningless: are empty sounds.” (Pg. 34)

He states, “Successful induction can be concerned only in the light of a genuine problem. An inductive problem is an intimation of coherence among hitherto uncomprehended particulars, and the problem is genuine to the extent to which this intimation is true. Such a surmise vaguely anticipates the evidence which will support it and guides the mind engrossed by it to the discovery of this evidence. This usually proceeds stepwise, the original problem and surmise being modified and corrected by each new piece of evidence, a process which is repeated until eventually some generalization is accepted as final.” (Pg. 131)

He explains, ”My definition of reality, as that which may yet exhaustibly manifest itself, implies the presence of an INDETERMINATE range of ANTICIPATIONS in any knowledge bearing on reality. But besides this indeterminacy of its prospects, tacit knowing may contain also an ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE that is indeterminate, in the sense that its content cannot be explicitly stated. We can see this best in the way we possess a skill. If I know how to ride a bicycle or how to swim, this does not mean that I can tell how I manage to keep my balance on a bicycle or keep afloat when swimming… does the successful teaching of skills and of the characteristic appearance of a physiognomy not prove that one CAN tell our knowledge of them? No, what the pupil must discover by an effort of his own is something we could not tell him. And he knows it then in his turn but cannot tell it. This result… shows also that such tacit knowledge can be DISCOVERED, without our being able to identify what it is what we have come to know.” (Pg. 141-142)

He says, “The fact that we can possess knowledge that is unspoken is a commonplace and so is the fact that we must know something yet unspoken before we can express it in words. It has been taken for granted in the philosophical analysis of language in earlier centuries, but modern positivism has tried to ignore it, on the grounds that tacit knowledge was not accessible to objective observation. The present theory of meaning assigns a firm place to the inarticulate meaning of experience and shows that it is the foundation of all explicit meaning.” (Pg. 187)

He observes, “We must conclude then that it is the effort of our imagination, seeking to re-interpret our vision in a way that will control the scene before us, which produces the right way of seeing inverted images. This is the dynamics of tacit knowing: the questing imagination vaguely anticipating experiences not yet grounded in subsidiary particulars evokes these subsidiaries and thus implements the experience the imagination has sought to achieve.” (Pg. 199-200)

He comments about Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind: “what actually follows from the fact that mind and body do not interact explicitly is that they interact according to the logic of tacit knowing. And it is this logic that disposes of the Cartesian dilemma by acknowledging two mutually exclusive ways of being aware of our body.” (Pg. 222-223)

He also makes a (quite understated) statement reflecting his belief in God: “We can account for this capacity of ours to know more than we can tell if we believe in the presence of an external reality with which we can establish contact. This I do. I declare myself committed to the belief in an external reality gradually accessible to knowing, and I regard all true understanding as an imitation of such a reality which, being real, may yet reveal itself to our deepened understanding in an indefinite range of unexpected manifestations. I accept the obligation to search for the truth though my own intimations of reality, knowing that there is, and can be, no strict rule by which my conclusions can be justified.”(Pg. 131)

These essays shed much light on other areas of Polanyi’s philosophy, which are not covered in his books such as “Personal Knowledge.”
Nafyn
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a Hungarian-British chemist and philosopher; he wrote other books such as Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy,The Tacit Dimension,The Logic of Liberty,Science, Faith, and Society, etc.

He points out, “The inconsistency of a science professing that it can explain all human action without making value judgments, while the scientist’s private actions are said to be often motivated by moral motives, can be more simply demonstrated the other way round. If the social scientist can explain all human actions by value-free observations, then none of his own actions can claim to be motivated by moral values. Either he exempts himself from his own theory of human motivation, or he must conclude that all reference to moral values---or any values---are meaningless: are empty sounds.” (Pg. 34)

He states, “Successful induction can be concerned only in the light of a genuine problem. An inductive problem is an intimation of coherence among hitherto uncomprehended particulars, and the problem is genuine to the extent to which this intimation is true. Such a surmise vaguely anticipates the evidence which will support it and guides the mind engrossed by it to the discovery of this evidence. This usually proceeds stepwise, the original problem and surmise being modified and corrected by each new piece of evidence, a process which is repeated until eventually some generalization is accepted as final.” (Pg. 131)

He explains, ”My definition of reality, as that which may yet exhaustibly manifest itself, implies the presence of an INDETERMINATE range of ANTICIPATIONS in any knowledge bearing on reality. But besides this indeterminacy of its prospects, tacit knowing may contain also an ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE that is indeterminate, in the sense that its content cannot be explicitly stated. We can see this best in the way we possess a skill. If I know how to ride a bicycle or how to swim, this does not mean that I can tell how I manage to keep my balance on a bicycle or keep afloat when swimming… does the successful teaching of skills and of the characteristic appearance of a physiognomy not prove that one CAN tell our knowledge of them? No, what the pupil must discover by an effort of his own is something we could not tell him. And he knows it then in his turn but cannot tell it. This result… shows also that such tacit knowledge can be DISCOVERED, without our being able to identify what it is what we have come to know.” (Pg. 141-142)

He says, “The fact that we can possess knowledge that is unspoken is a commonplace and so is the fact that we must know something yet unspoken before we can express it in words. It has been taken for granted in the philosophical analysis of language in earlier centuries, but modern positivism has tried to ignore it, on the grounds that tacit knowledge was not accessible to objective observation. The present theory of meaning assigns a firm place to the inarticulate meaning of experience and shows that it is the foundation of all explicit meaning.” (Pg. 187)

He observes, “We must conclude then that it is the effort of our imagination, seeking to re-interpret our vision in a way that will control the scene before us, which produces the right way of seeing inverted images. This is the dynamics of tacit knowing: the questing imagination vaguely anticipating experiences not yet grounded in subsidiary particulars evokes these subsidiaries and thus implements the experience the imagination has sought to achieve.” (Pg. 199-200)

He comments about Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind: “what actually follows from the fact that mind and body do not interact explicitly is that they interact according to the logic of tacit knowing. And it is this logic that disposes of the Cartesian dilemma by acknowledging two mutually exclusive ways of being aware of our body.” (Pg. 222-223)

He also makes a (quite understated) statement reflecting his belief in God: “We can account for this capacity of ours to know more than we can tell if we believe in the presence of an external reality with which we can establish contact. This I do. I declare myself committed to the belief in an external reality gradually accessible to knowing, and I regard all true understanding as an imitation of such a reality which, being real, may yet reveal itself to our deepened understanding in an indefinite range of unexpected manifestations. I accept the obligation to search for the truth though my own intimations of reality, knowing that there is, and can be, no strict rule by which my conclusions can be justified.”(Pg. 131)

These essays shed much light on other areas of Polanyi’s philosophy, which are not covered in his books such as “Personal Knowledge.”
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