# Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis (Nato Science Series D:) ePub download

## by J.F. Mertens,S. Sorin

**Author:**J.F. Mertens,S. Sorin**ISBN:**0792330110**ISBN13:**978-0792330110**ePub:**1126 kb |**FB2:**1722 kb**Language:**English**Category:**Business & Finance**Publisher:**Springer; 1994 edition (July 31, 1994)**Pages:**268**Rating:**4.2/5**Votes:**141**Format:**docx rtf mobi doc

JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis

JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the "birth" of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization).

Read instantly in your browser. Series: Nato Science Series D: (Book 77). Hardcover: 268 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0792330110.

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Start by marking Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis as Want to Read . JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis

Start by marking Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read. JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the "birth" of general equi- librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis.

NATO Advanced Study Institute: Game Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis. B. Allen: Existence of Equilibria for Markets with a Continuum of Traders. S. Sorin: The Core Equivalence Theorem. Organized by Jean-François Mertens. July 1 to July 12, 1991. Stony Brook, New York. R. Vohra: The Equivalence Theorem for the Bargaining Set. F. Mertens: Core Equivalence with Atoms. Aumann: Axiomatization of the Value (Finite Case), Including NTU and Variable Threats. Wednesday, july 3. .

1994 Game Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis, (NATO ASI), . Mertens and S. Sorin (ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers

1994 Game Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis, (NATO ASI), ., Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1979 Une introduction aux jeux répétés à deux joueurs, à somme nulle et à information incomplète, Cahiers du Groupe de Mathématiques Economiques, 1, 92 . 1979. version anglaise IMSSS, Stanford, 1980). Sorin, S. (1998) Distribution equilibrium I: Definition and examples, Cahier du THEMA, 9835. (1997) Analyse des situations de relations stratégiques: approche par la théorie des jeux

Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis : Proceedings of.

Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis : Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute on Long Island, NY, U. July 1-12, 1991. by Jean-Francois Mertens.

This book presents the first systematic exposition of the use of game-theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Rather than focusing on single concepts it covers all basic equivalence theorems – core, bargaining set, Shapley and Harsanyi value, Nash equilibria – including an axiomatic approach to them. It treats thoroughly the value of large games, and the new tools used in the strategic approach to general equilibrium. The different chapters are written by leaders of their respective fields.

tion IV, we use our methods to provide. welfare analyses of two other oligopoly prob-.

mergers to raise welfare. We show that traditional merger analysis can be. misleading in its use of the Herfindahl Index. Our analysis stresses the output. tion IV, we use our methods to provide. lems: commitment in Cournot competition