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The War Managers ePub download

by Douglas Kinnard

  • Author: Douglas Kinnard
  • ISBN: 0895292815
  • ISBN13: 978-0895292810
  • ePub: 1839 kb | FB2: 1847 kb
  • Language: English
  • Category: Military
  • Publisher: Avery Pub Group; First Edition edition (April 1, 1985)
  • Pages: 226
  • Rating: 4.7/5
  • Votes: 297
  • Format: txt azw docx mobi
The War Managers ePub download

Douglas Kinnard, a 1944 graduate of West Point, served in combat in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, retiring as. .and before their memories of the war faded. from the Preface) General Kinnard began this effort in 1974 and the book was ready for publication by 1985

Douglas Kinnard, a 1944 graduate of West Point, served in combat in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, retiring as a brigadier general. After receiving a P. from Princeton, he taught at the University of Vermont, at which he is now professor emeritus of political science. Subsequently, he was on the faculty of the Naval War College and the National Defense University. from the Preface) General Kinnard began this effort in 1974 and the book was ready for publication by 1985. I had never heard of this book before and it is a great shame that more people have not been exposed to it.

The War Managers book. In 1947 Douglas Kinnard sent out an extensive questionnaire to the 173 Army generals who had managed the war in Vietnam. In 1947 Douglas Kinnard sent out an extensive questionnaire to the.

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Army generals responsible for its conduct in the field. First published in 1977 to great acclaim, the painful indictment of both the military and civilian policy makers serves as a useful guide on how to avoid similar disasters in today's conflicts.

Douglas Kinnard, American political scientist, educator. Member of Princeton University Alumni Association, Association Graduates United States Military Academy, International Institute Strategic Studies, New England Political Science Associations, Princeton (New York ), Nassau (Princeton). President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics (Ausa Institute of Land Warfare). 74344/?tag prabook0b-20.

Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985. Komer, Robert W. Memo To President Johnson. LBJ Library, Austin, TX, Guam Conference File Notes, 18 March 1967.

My Copy of The War Managers. The death on July 29 of retired Army general and professor Douglas Kinnard at the age of 91 reminded me of the vital quality of integrity and truth-telling, especially in life-and-death military settings. The general officers who answered Kinnard’s survey in The War Managers give the lie to the so-called Rambo myth, the idea that the American military could and should have won the Vietnam War, but were prevented from doing so by meddling civilians, mendacious media, and malicious hippie war resisters. The survey results bear this out.

Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege ofDien Bien Phu. New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1967. Viet-Nam Witness 1953-1966. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966

Fall, Bernard B. Praeger, 1966. Street Without Joy. Harrison, PA: The Stackpole C. 1967. Interview With History. 1974 Trans, by John Shepley. Milan: Liveright Publishing Corp. Fanning, Louis A. Betrayal in Vietnam. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, Publishers, 1976.

These are two very different books by a retired Army general who earned his P. from Princeton in 1973. The first is a good - but not great - study of Eisenhower's strategic policymaking, the thesis being that, contrary to popular belief, Eisenhower was a strong leader and manager. The second work provides the best view to date of the opinions of 108 Army generals who fought the Vietnam War. The generals' responses to standard questions were extremely varied, indicating an absence.

Cover worn. Shipped from the U.K. All orders received before 3pm sent that weekday.
Buridora
The late Douglas Kinnard; retired Army Brigadier General seeing combat in World War II, Korea and Vietnam; a professor of political science at the University of Vermont; and former US Army Chief of Military History; has written a very important work to assess or “[reassess] the war from the point of view of its Army General Officer managers while they were still available and before their memories of the war faded.” (from the Preface) General Kinnard began this effort in 1974 and the book was ready for publication by 1985. I had never heard of this book before and it is a great shame that more people have not been exposed to it.

What the author did was send “…a sixty-item questionnaire to the 173 Army Generals who had commanded in Vietnam. The response was astonishing-64 percent of them completed the questionnaire, and many added pages of comment.” Using secondary sources and “…research in certain files in the Army Center of Military History and conduct[ing] in-depth interviews with a selected group of the generals who responded to the questionnaires” (p vii) the author analyzed the data and developed a remarkable narrative. All the generals remained anonymous. The result is a highly informative and succinct work that covers a great deal, most perhaps, of the issues and controversies of fighting that war.

It is well known that the grand strategic conduct of the war was largely controlled by civilians in Washington, DC but, since it was a war, the US military will always be saddled with the great burden of responsibility for all the death and destruction and ultimately the loss of that war.

“…no expeditionary force has ever been subjected to so many detailed constraints upon the military commanders’ freedom of action, and at the same time received such severe criticism for not achieving better results.” (p vi) The results the author achieved in his study is extraordinary.

This study clearly shows the deep disappointment in the outcome of the war, as is to be expected, but the survey was sent to the generals in 1974 before the final outcome was known. At the time the generals set their thoughts to paper the war as not a loss. However, even at that time, when asked, “Were the results of the war worth the effort, considering casualties, disruption of the United States political scene, and side effects on United States society and the United States military?” More than a quarter of the respondents said it was not. Another quarter answered that it “Should not have progressed past an advisory effort.” So in 1974, when 57% of these same generals said, “[The] ARVN is adequate and chances of their holding in the future are better than fifty-fifty,” fully 53% thought that large US ground combat formations should have never been committed in Vietnam. That is just a remarkable response from the generals who fought the war. And the war, at the time, was not considered a loss for the American Army. Really stunning!

General Kinnard includes, under a section titled “Professionalism,” a brief mention of the rising interest among the officer corps in airborne training. I found this a little unusual. I was with the 82nd Abn Division and it was obvious to me, a one term volunteer from 1972-1975, that if you were interested in an Army career you needed to go to Jump School. You needed those wings on your chest. Without a war to generate medals a career minded officer or enlisted man needed to gather as many items to pin to his chest as the Army offered in the way of schools: Jump School, Ranger School, Jungle School, etc. As for airborne qualification, you will notice that every current general officer has Jump Wings.

In all this is a truly fascinating study and, I think, a very important contribution to understanding the tragedy of Vietnam.
Мох
Interesting compendium of questions asked of Vietnam era generals about the war. Some of the interpretations are quite good but the conclusions are mostly left up to the reader.
Mysterious Wrench
A great read. Brought back lots of memories.
Fani
I read the book because of a reference used in another book. The book is late 1970's with comments and observations from generals who served in Vietnam. Nothing extraordinary and most of the information we know from historical accounts.

And, of the 58,000 US KIA...most would believe the war in Vietnam could of been avoided and to all those who lost their lives at places like Dak To, the SF border camps along the Laotian border..or hill fights in I Corps..we shall miss them all and hold them in our hearts.

Lessons learned from Vietnam unfortunately may not be keystones of decisions in places like Korengal Valley or Takur Ghar/Paktia Province, Afghanistan.
White gold
Item as described, fast shipping, very pleased.... Thanks...!!
Rolling Flipper
When it was first published in 1977 "The War Managers" was an earth shattering revelation on the conduct of the Vietnam War that is hard to understand today. What General Kinnard relayed in it laid the groundwork for the reassessment of the war and where it went fundamentally wrong and most authors and historians writing on the Vietnam War use this as a standard reference. People who read it now have no idea or concept of radical Kinnard's assessment was, especially so soon after the end of the war, but it helped reshape political and military leaders understanding of whether or not we should get involved in a conflict and how deeply, not to mention the question of an exit strategy. Kinnard, a general himself who served in World War II, the Korean Conflict, and the Vietnam War, polled more than 170 generals who had been assigned to Vietnam during the peak years of involvement from 1965 to 1972 to garner firsthand knowledge of their experiences, promising anonymity to any who responded. Kinnard was so respected that over 100 participated, giving him a huge wealth of firsthand data to use and shape into this book. Needless to say the results were stunning; more than half felt the war wasn't worth the casualties on our side and the resultant disruption back in the US or they believed we should have left our involvement at the Advisory stage effectively "Vietnamizing" the war far earlier. That there was a fundamental disconnect between the military command and civilian leadership is quite telling as apparently President Johnson's conduct of the war brooked considerable dissent from many line officers who did not want the war to escalate. Most of the generals surveyed had no idea how they were supposed to be conducting the war or how to evaluate success, becoming instead engaged in a fruitless body count that created the impression the US and South Vietnam were winning a war of attrition. Yet most realized they weren't winning hearts or minds on either side. Indeed the body count became a gruesome metric for the war, something generated to create the impression of success and dutifully repeated by the media as pointing towards success, a count that was grossly exaggerated as Kinnard points out.

The portrait painted by Kinnard is of a political leadership treating the Vietnam War as though it were one of many Cabinet level agencies requesting and requiring attention, but not receiving the full energies of a wartime President as was the case with Lincoln or FDR. The war was a distraction and an annoyance. The Johnson Administration had no idea how central the Vietnam War was to it's survival until it was too late and then desperately flung all of its energies at it. By then it was truly too late. Most of the generals, line officers, and troops had realized it was a foolish gambit with no chance of success; the only problem was the political leadership had failed to make that same realization. I'd read this some years ago in a Military History course that generated quite a lively discussion between those old enough like myself to remember the war and those young enough that had no memory. It is a tough read for members of my generation who had friends whose fathers, older brothers, and uncles were killed in the war. Knowing that our political leadership had this potential information at their fingertips yet failed to reach out angers me profoundly on so many levels. President Johnson's escalation of the war, in retrospect, was a foolish choice especially in light of scholarship that shows President Kennedy did not want to escalate as related in JFK's Last Hundred Days: The Transformation of a Man and the Emergence of a Great President and To Move the World: JFK's Quest for Peace. Johnson hung his hat on the Vietnam War and rightly should be judged a failure by that metric. General Kinnard opened the door to a fair, honest, and realistic assessment and historiographical debate on the Vietnam War and for that we can be thankful!
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